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DIGITAL EURO AND ECB POWERS 
SERAINA GRÜNEWALD, CORINNE ZELLWEGER-GUTKNECHT, BENJAMIN GEVA* 
Abstract 
The use of cash in the euro area is declining. Accordingly, the European
Central Bank is exploring options for the design of a digital euro as a form
of central bank money available to the public. This article addresses the 
key question of whether the Eurosystem is empowered to issue a digital 
euro and, if so, in what form. Based on a historical, teleological, and 
systematic interpretation, it argues that Article 128(1) TFEU serves as 
both a source of competence for the Eurosystem to issue a digital euro and
a limitation to that competence. The Eurosystem’s powers are necessarily
exclusive and must prevail over the remaining competence of Member 
States to issue tangible coins on the basis of Article 128(2) TFEU. The 
article also addresses whether a digital euro would and should possess
legal tender status, referring to recent case law in the field. 
1. Introduction 
Digitalization increasingly affects all aspects of our lives and of society at 
large. Money is no exception. The ways in which we pay and save are 
changing, driven by considerations of convenience and a demand for 
immediacy. While cash – the only form of central bank money available to the 
public to date – continues to dominate in payments of small amounts, the 
general trend is towards cashless and even contactless payments using cards, 
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European Central Bank (ECB) under its Legal Research Programme 2020 (topic 2): 
Zellweger-Gutknecht, Geva and Grünewald, “The ECB and ¤ E-Banknotes” (Draft of 31 July 
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smartphone apps, or smartwatches.1 While resort to cash as a store of value 
may be taken in exceptional circumstances,2 the vast majority of European 
citizens deposit their savings in bank accounts or invest them in financial 
markets or real estate. Private actors, such as large technology firms, are 
developing global payment solutions attuned to the public’s new demands. 
The availability of “stablecoins”,3 which are not necessarily denominated in 
euro, may further diminish the attractiveness of the euro’s physical attributes 
as a means of payment and potentially as a store of value. 
These developments and future prospects have prompted the European 
Central Bank, like other central banks,4 to explore options for the design of a 
digital euro to complement (and potentially replace over time) tangible euro 
cash, thereby making a more contemporary form of central bank money 
available to the public.5 Of course, digital means of payment already exist in 
the form of electronic transfers, but these transfers are conducted in money 
created by commercial banks and are only ultimately settled in central bank 
money.6 What is lacking, however, is a digital euro issued by the Eurosystem7 
that can be used by the public in daily life – in other words, a digital equivalent 
to euro banknotes. 
1. While there are differences among the Member States, overall, the use of cash in the euro 
area is declining. See Esselink and Hernández, “The use of cash by households in the euro 
area”, ECB Occasional Paper Series No. 201 (Nov. 2017). 
2. After the collapse of Lehman Brothers, for example, the German Bundesbank issued as 
many EUR 500 banknotes in a single month as it had during the entire preceding year. See 
Weidmann, “Eröffnungsrede” in Deutsche Bundesbank (Ed.), 3. Bargeldsymposium der 
Deutschen Bundesbank 2016 (Frankfurt, July 2016), pp. 9–18, at p. 13. 
3. See Arner, Auer and Frost, “Stablecoins: Risks, potential and regulation”, BIS Working 
Papers No. 905 (Nov. 2020); Financial Stability Board (FSB), “Regulation, supervision and 
oversight of ‘global stablecoin’ arrangements” (13 Oct. 2020); International Crypto-Assets 
Task Force (ICA-TF), “Stablecoins: Implications for monetary policy, financial stability, 
market infrastructure and payments, and banking supervision in the euro area”, ECB 
Occasional Paper Series No. 247 (Sept. 2020). Stablecoins differ from other private digital 
currencies in that their value is kept particularly stable through selected mechanisms: while 
asset-linked stablecoins are backed with correspondingly secure assets, algorithm-based 
stablecoins are adjusted with respect to quantity in response to demand via the underlying 
protocol. 
4. Examples include Banque de France, “Central bank digital currency” (8 Jan. 2020); Bank 
of Canada, “Contingency planning for a central bank digital currency” (25 Feb. 2020); Bank of 
England, “Central bank digital currency: Opportunities, challenges and design”, Discussion 
Paper (March 2020). See also BIS Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures and 
Markets Committee, “Central bank digital currencies”, CPMI Papers No. 174 (March 2018); 
Bossu, Itatani, Margulis, Rossi, Weenink and Yoshinaga, “Legal aspects of central bank digital 
currency: Central bank and monetary law considerations”, International Monetary Fund 
Working Paper No. 20/254 (Nov. 2020). 
5. See European Central Bank, “Report on a digital euro” (Oct. 2020). 
6. This happens in the form of reserves held by commercial banks with the central bank. 
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In light of the principle of conferral8 and the need for the ECB to act within 
its mandate, the issuance of a digital euro must align with both the objectives 
and powers conferred on the Eurosystem. This article argues that the ECB will 
no longer be able to deliver on its mandate if the use of cash continues to 
decline. Accordingly, the issuance of a digital euro would address two key 
policy objectives.9 First, a digital euro would help satisfy the continuing need 
for a form of public money that exhibits the unique features of cash (section 
2.1). By providing costless access to a simple, universally accepted, credit 
risk-free, and trusted means of payment and store of value, the euro represents 
an important public good for European citizens.10 Second, a digital euro 
would offer an alternative to the use of “stablecoins” for European retail 
payments, thereby forestalling massive migration into private digital 
currencies. By complementing (and eventually assuming) the anchor function 
of tangible euro cash, a digital euro would help safeguard the monetary 
transmission mechanism and thus the ECB’s control over monetary policy 
(section 2.2).11 
The issuance of a digital euro would involve numerous fundamental 
economic, technological, and legal choices and challenges, not all of which 
can be discussed here. This article focuses on the pivotal question of whether 
the ECB and the National Central Banks (NCBs) of the euro area, as the 
authorities in charge of issuing the euro, are empowered to issue a digital euro 
under the EU’s existing legal framework. While other legal foundations may 
be explored as a basis for the issuance of a digital euro,12 the analysis 
undertaken here is limited to interpreting Article 128 TFEU13 and Article 16 
7. In the interest of simplicity, this article uses the term “Eurosystem” to refer to the ECB 
and National Central Banks (NCBs) of the euro area collectively, while acknowledging that 
only the ECB and the NCBs possess legal personality and can thus be bearers of functions and 
powers. 
8. Art. 5(1) and (2) TEU, O.J. 2012, C 326/13. 
9. For an in-depth analysis of these objectives, see Zellweger-Gutknecht, Geva and 
Grünewald, “Digital euro, monetary objects and price stability – A legal analysis” Journal of 
Financial Regulation (forthcoming). 
10. See ECB Report cited supra note 5, at p. 10; Panetta, “We must be prepared to issue a 
digital euro”, blog post (2 Oct. 2020), <www.ecb.europa.eu/press/blog/date/2020/html/ecb. 
blog201002~12ab1c06b5.en.html>, (all websites last visited 12 March 2021). 
11. ECB Report cited supra note 5, at p. 12. See also G7 Working Group on Stablecoins: 
Investigating the impact of global stablecoins (BIS, Oct. 2019), at 15–16. 
12. For the ECB/Eurosystem, this includesArt. 127 TFEU and Art. 20 of the ESCB Statute. 
See ECB Report cited supra note 5, at p. 24; Omlor and Birne, “Digitales Zentralbankgeld im 
Euroraum”, (2020) Recht Digital, 1–10, at 5. 
13. Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, O.J. 
2012, C 326/47. 
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of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) Statute.14 The discussion 
thus naturally centres around a digital euro in the form of immaterial tokens 
recorded on the liability side of central banks’ balance sheets and circulating 
in the economy through the transfer of these tokens (i.e. a token-based digital 
euro).15 
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows: section 2 makes the case 
for powers of the Eurosystem to issue a digital euro under its public money 
issue function according to Article 128(1) TFEU and Article 16 ESCB Statute 
on the basis of Treaty interpretation. Section 3 argues that these powers of the 
Eurosystem are necessarily exclusive and must prevail over the competence of 
Member States to issue tangible coins in accordance with Article 128(2) 
TFEU. The scope of the Eurosystem’s issuance powers, their delegability and 
potential interferences with commercial banks’ fundamental rights, and the 
principle of an open market economy are addressed in Section 4. Section 5 
explores whether a digital euro can and should be legal tender, offering the 
same benefits and degree of trust associated with tangible euro cash. Section 
6 concludes the article. 
2. The Eurosystem as the issuer of tangible and digital public 
money 
Article 128(1) TFEU and Article 16 ESCB Statute confer upon the ECB the 
function and power to authorize the issuance of euro banknotes within the EU. 
Both the ECB and the NCBs of the euro area Member States are entitled to 
issue euro banknotes. While the competence to issue banknotes was elevated 
to the EU level, the euro area Member States have remained the legal issuers 
of euro coins according to Article 128(2) TFEU. The volume of coins issued 
by euro area Member States, however, is subject to approval by the ECB. 
This section explores whether Article 128(1) TFEU and Article 16 ESCB 
Statute provide sufficient legal basis for the Eurosystem to issue (or for the 
14. Statute of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and of the ECB, Protocol (No. 
4) on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, 
O.J. 2016, C 202/230. 
15. On the distinction between token-based (or value-based) and account-based models of 
central bank digital currency, without advocating particularly for either of them, see e.g. ECB 
Report cited supra note 5, at pp. 29–30. See further Bossu et al., op. cit. supra note 4, in 
particular at 9, 12–13. Our assumption is that an account-based digital euro may be useful for 
wholesale purposes but would almost certainly create confusion among retail users, thus 
endangering the singleness of the euro. For further details, see Geva, Grünewald and 
Zellweger-Gutknecht, “The e-banknote as a ‘banknote’: A monetary law interpreted”, Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies (forthcoming). Published as advance article, at <academic.oup. 
com/ojls/advance-article/doi/10.1093/ojls/gqab019/6284236>. 
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ECB to authorize the issuance of) a digital euro. It is argued that Article 
128(1) TFEU and Article 16 ESCB Statute provide for both a source of 
competence for the Eurosystem to issue a digital euro and a limitation to that 
competence. Article 128(1) TFEU and Article 16 ESCB Statute provide for a 
source of competence in that they confer upon the Eurosystem the power to 
issue banknotes, which may be either tangible or digital in format. However, 
the provisions limit the issuance of digital banknotes to a functional design 
that mimics tangible banknotes. The argument proceeds from textual via 
historic and teleological (2.1) to systematic reasons (2.2). 
2.1. Digital euro as “banknotes” 
The wording of Article 128(1) TFEU and Article 16 ESCB Statute does not 
preclude the issuance of euro banknotes in media other than paper. Both 
provisions mention “banknotes” without specifying the material or format in 
which banknotes are to be issued. “Issuing” essentially refers to the 
appearance as a liability on the central bank’s balance sheet and does not per 
se imply that the euro must necessarily be expressed in tangible banknotes. 
The drafting history of Article 128(1) TFEU and Article 16 ESCB Statute 
supports this understanding. As the Maastricht Treaty came into force before 
the internet had begun to have an impact on economic and social interactions 
on a massive scale and the first forms of e-money16 had evolved, it is 
unsurprising that working groups tasked with the future issuance of euro 
banknotes had paper-based banknotes in mind.17 The available negotiation 
records, however, reveal no evidence of a qualified silence on the part of the 
Treaty drafters in the sense that they intended to exclude media other than 
paper for banknotes covered by Article 128(1) TFEU. The fact that the 
emergence of the internet and private digital currencies (such as Liberty 
Reserve in 200618) did not lead to an amendment of the provision in the 
16. According to Art. 2(2) of Directive 2009/110/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the taking up, pursuit, and prudential supervision of the business of electronic 
money institutions, O.J. 2009, L 267/7 (E-Money Directive), “electronic money” or “e-money” 
refers to “electronically, including magnetically, stored monetary value as represented by a 
claim on the issuer which is issued on receipt of funds for the purpose of making payment 
transactions as defined in point 5 of Art. 4 of Directive 2007/64/EC, and which is accepted by 
a natural or legal person other than the electronic money issuer”. 
17. See e.g. ECB, “Report on the legal protection of banknotes in the EU Member States” 
(9 Nov. 1999), at p. 41 (“authorized paper money”); see also p. 5 with reference to a “Working 
Group on Printing and Issuing a European Banknote (BNWG)” (emphasis added). 
18. See <www.coindesk.com/company/liberty-reserve>. 
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Treaties of Amsterdam (1997), Nice (2001), and Lisbon (2007), does not 
indicate any such qualified silence.At the time, these private digital currencies 
were still in their infancy. A discussion of their effects on central banking and 
the prospect of introducing central bank digital currencies that would be made 
available to the general public began only about a decade after the signing of 
the Treaty of Lisbon.19 While technology may have facilitated the issuance of 
central bank digital currency already at the time of these Treaty amendments, 
the evidence suggests that the drafters simply did not have digital euro 
banknotes on their radars.20 Consequently, they neither explicitly provided for 
the issuance of digital euro banknotes nor explicitly – even silently – excluded 
them from the scope of Article 128(1) TFEU and Article 16 ESCB Statute. 
Thus, the wording and drafting history of the provisions reveal no 
compelling reasons that would exclude the issuance of digital banknotes. 
Article 128(1) TFEU and Article 16 ESCB Statute are drafted in a relatively 
abstract and open manner and lend themselves to a broad reading as far as the 
format of banknote issuance is concerned. However, that alone does not 
positively empower the Eurosystem to issue a digital euro. Positive 
empowerment depends on a purposive reading of Article 128(1) TFEU and 
Article 16 ESCB Statute that is consistent with the dynamic and evolving 
nature of the Monetary Union and the ECB more specifically.21 It takes into 
account the evolution of the concept of the banknote, of which the transition 
from paper to digital merely constitutes the latest in a sequence of 
evolutionary steps. The media in which banknotes are issued have evolved in 
parallel with technological development and will do so again with the move to 
a digital format. In the digital age, the requirement for banknotes to be 
“written” to give them permanence may just as well be satisfied by a digital 
19. The Bank of England led the way in initiating this global discussion. See e.g. Bank of 
England, “One bank research agenda”, Discussion Paper (Feb. 2015), at 31 (“Why might central 
banks issue digital currencies?”); Cleland, “Digital future for Sterling: Assessing the 
implications” (Bank of England, 5 July 2017). 
20. Similarly, Banque de France Report cited supra note 4, at p. 31. The present authors 
refute, however, the assumption in this report that Art. 16(2) ESCB Statute refers to the issuance 
of physical banknotes as an “existing practice” that needs to be respected “as far as possible”. 
The drafting history of the ESCB Statute reveals that this provision was narrowly targeted at 
existing practices regarding the issue and purely graphic design of banknotes in the UK (see 
footnote 29). 
21. The ECJ frequently uses teleological interpretation. In CILFIT, it affirmed that “… 
every provision of [EU] law must be placed in its context and interpreted in the light of the 
provisions of [EU] law as a whole, regard being had to the objectives thereof and to its state of 
evolution at the date on which the provision in question is to be applied” (emphasis added). 
Case C-283/ 81, CILFIT v. Ministero della Sanità, EU:C:1982:335, para 20. 
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record.22 This is not revolutionary, nor does it encroach conceptually on the 
banknote’s defining features.23 
A purposive reading of Article 128(1) TFEU and Article 16 ESCB Statute 
suggests further that the tangible format of banknotes is of secondary 
importance and that the defining feature of banknotes instead relates to their 
function. Banknotes are intended to serve as a credit risk-free and trusted 
means of payment and store of value that is accessible to the general public. 
Accordingly, Article 128(1) TFEU and Article 16 ESCB Statute placed the 
Eurosystem in charge of publicly issuing such retail money. The medium of 
that issuance, however, may adapt to (unanticipated) changes in technology 
and user demand. 
2.2. The digital euro as a precondition of monetary policy 
At the same time, it is this defining function of banknotes that limits the 
Eurosystem’s powers to issue a digital euro on the basis of Article 128(1) 
TFEU and Article 16 ESCB Statute. Their intangible nature renders digital 
banknotes significantly more versatile than paper banknotes and allows for 
their use to serve other functions, including functions that may as yet remain 
unanticipated. Technically speaking, digital banknotes could open up new 
horizons in the conduct of monetary policy.24 They could be designed in a way 
that would allow the ECB to influence the public’s demand, including by 
paying or collecting interest on digital banknotes and by imposing limits on 
their holding or use.25 This is expected to improve the pass-through of policy 
rate changes.26 Moreover, negative interest on digital banknotes could provide 
monetary stimulus in extreme circumstances. If cash were simultaneously 
22. For an in-depth analysis see Geva, Grünewald and Zellweger-Gutknecht, op cit. supra 
note 15. 
23. Apparently dissenting, Bossu et al., op. cit. supra note 4, at 16, who distinguish – 
somewhat artificially – between “currency” on the one hand and “banknotes” and “coins” on 
the other without considering a broad interpretation of the latter terms and a teleological reading 
of the “writing” requirement. 
24. See ECB Report cited supra note 5, at pp. 12–13, for a “thought experiment” by the 
ECB in that direction. 
25. These limits could be imposed on a per person or per transaction basis or overall and as 
an alternative to or in combination with interest. 
26. E.g. Armelius, Boel, Clausen and Nessén, “The e-krona and the macroeconomy” in 
Special issue on the e-krona, (2018) Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review, 43–65, at 52. See 
also BIS CPMI/MC Report cited supra note 4, at 10–12. 
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abolished or made costly, interest-bearing digital banknotes could serve to 
alleviate the effective lower bound constraint.27,28 
However, designing digital euro banknotes as an instrument of monetary 
policy, while technically feasible, is legally inadmissible on the basis of 
Article 128(1) TFEU and Article 16 ESCB Statute. While these provisions 
allow for the issuance of digital banknotes by the Eurosystem in principle, 
they restrict the use of digital banknotes to the functions of tangible cash. In 
other words, to be covered by Article 128(1) TFEU and Article 16 ESCB 
Statute, digital banknotes must be designed as a functional equivalent to 
tangible banknotes.29 Accordingly, their functions must be limited to those of 
a means of payment and a store of value, excluding their use as a monetary 
policy instrument. 
This reading is supported by a systematic interpretation of Article 128(1) 
TFEU and Article 16 ESCB Statute. Both the Treaty and the ESCB Statute 
mention banknote issuance separately from the basic tasks of monetary 
policy.30 In earlier drafts of the Maastricht Treaty, banknote issuance was also 
listed as a basic task of the ESCB (in addition to the provision on competence) 
27. The effective lower bound (ELB) refers to the floor for nominal interest rates. It lies a 
few decimal points below zero as it takes into account the costs incurred by holding 
non-interest-bearing cash (rather than reserves), including expenses for storage, insurance, 
transport, etc. 
28. Nabilou, “Testing the waters of the Rubicon: The European Central Bank and central 
bank digital currencies”, (2020) Journal of Banking Regulation, 299–314, at 309–310; 
Meaning, Dyson, Barker and Clayton, “Broadening narrow money: Monetary policy with a 
central bank digital currency”, Bank of England Staff Working Paper No. 724 (May 2018); 
Nessén, Sellin and Asberg, “The implications of an e-krona for the Riksbank’s operational 
framework for implementing monetary policy” in Special issue on the e-krona, cited supra note 
26, 29–42, at 36; Agarwal and Kimball, “Breaking through the Zero Lower Bound”, IMF 
Working Paper WP/15/224 (23 Oct. 2015). 
29. Reports issued by De Nederlandsche Bank and the Banque de France have arrived at 
similar conclusions. See Wierts and Boven, “Central bank digital currency – Objectives, 
preconditions and design choices”, 20-21 De Nederlandsche Bank Occasional Studies (April 
2020), at 28; Banque de France Report cited supra note 4, at p. 31. These reports base their 
argumentation on Art. 16(2) ESCB Statute, which states “The ECB shall respect as far as 
possible existing practices regarding the issue and design of banknotes.” However, this 
provision should be considered in the context of its specific historical background. It was added 
to satisfy the British, who wanted to retain the right for some commercial banks in Scotland and 
Northern Ireland to issue banknotes and to include the portrait of Queen Elizabeth II on the 
national side of euro banknotes issued by the Bank of England should the UK enter Stage Three 
of the EMU. See Van den Berg, The Making of the Statute of the European System of Central 
Banks – An Application of Checks and Balances (Rozenberg Publishers, 2005), at pp. 326, 333, 
339–341. With Brexit, this provision has obviously lost its original relevance. 
30. See Art. 127(2) TFEU; Art. 3.1 ESCB Statute. The fact that Art. 16 ESCB Statute is 
placed under Chapter III (Organisation of the ESCB) instead of Chapter IV (Monetary 
Functions and Operations of the ESCB), however, is the result of an oversight that was never 
corrected. See Van den Berg, op. cit. supra note 29, at p. 338. 
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but was subsequently removed from that list prior to the adoption of the 
Treaty.31 This drafting process evidences the special (legal) character of 
banknote issuance: while it is a fundamental task of the Eurosystem, banknote 
issuance does not directly pertain to the tasks listed in Article 127(2) TFEU 
and Article 3.1. ESCB Statute. Rather, it constitutes a precondition for the 
fulfilment of these tasks. For this reason, the decision to codify both the 
competence and the task of banknote issuance in a separate article was logical. 
Banknotes – whether tangible or digital – enable the Eurosystem to fulfil its 
basic tasks on a fundamental level but without directly constituting an 
instrument or tool in the conduct of policies in fulfilment of these tasks. In 
other words, the fact that banknote issuance is codified in a separate article 
supports the notion that banknotes are a logical precondition for monetary 
policy, but were never intended to serve as an instrument of that policy. 
It follows naturally from a systematic reading of Article 128(1) TFEU and 
Article 16 ESCB Statute that banknote issuance is not merely a right that is 
attributed to the Eurosystem but is accompanied by a duty to utilize that right, 
which cannot be fully waived or delegated. Monetary policy transmission 
within the Eurosystem depends on the extensive utilization of monetary 
objects denominated in euros, such as (tangible or digital) banknotes and 
deposits. Migration out of the euro due to an increasing switch to 
non-euro-denominated private digital currencies would significantly weaken 
the monetary policy transmission mechanism and thus the ECB’s ability to 
deliver on its mandate.32 Deposits and other private monies (even if 
denominated in euros) are insufficient to ensure smooth monetary policy 
transmission.33 As private debts, they are associated with a default risk of the 
private issuer.The fungibility of deposits (and other private monies) is assured, 
because they are convertible on demand into banknotes at par value. At the 
same time, the availability of banknotes has a disciplining effect on banks, in 
that badly managed banks must expect depositors to withdraw their deposits. 
A publicly issued, credit risk-free money is thus needed as an anchor to 
maintain the quality of deposits, the uniformity of money, as well as the 
stability of the banking system in the medium to long term.34 
Accordingly, the Eurosystem cannot discontinue the issuance of cash on its 
own initiative.35 Neither can it allow cash to disappear naturally (i.e. as a result 
31. Van den Berg, op. cit. supra note 29, at pp. 332–333. 
32. See ECB Report cited supra note 5, at p. 12. 
33. Dissenting Hofmann, “The changing concept of money: A threat to the monetary 
system or an opportunity for the financial sector?”, 21 EBOR (2020), 37–68, at 58–65. 
34. For an in-depth account of that argument see Zellweger-Gutknecht, Geva and 
Grünewald, op. cit. supra note 9. 
35. See also Opinion of A.G. Pitruzzella in Joined Cases C-422 & 423/19, Johannes 
Dietrich and Norbert Häring v. Hessischer Rundfunk, EU:C:2020:756, para 95 
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of changing demand).36 As the use of cash dwindles, the ECB loses a 
fundamental basis for its monetary policy and thus risks becoming unable to 
deliver on its mandate. The issuance of a digital euro might then be necessary 
to replace the functions of cash and maintain an essential precondition of its 
mandate. While a significant and persistent waning of cash may appear to be 
a development in a distant future, the Eurosystem has a duty to act in 
anticipation of that point. Private initiatives will undoubtedly continue to seek 
to fill the void by issuing digital currencies. Network effects – that is, the fact 
that a growing number of users of a digital currency increases that digital 
currency’s utility for each new and existing user – require central banks to be 
among the first movers. 
3. The Eurosystem’s exclusive competence to issue a digital euro 
Based on Article 128(1) TFEU and Article 16 ESCB Statute, the Eurosystem 
is competent to issue digital banknotes to the extent that these banknotes 
exhibit a cash-like functional design. What remains to be clarified is whether 
the Eurosystem is exclusively competent to issue a digital euro. As Member 
States have retained their competence to issue euro coins according to Article 
128(2)TFEU, they arguably retain the power to issue some sort of “digital euro 
coins” alongside the Eurosystem’s issuance of “digital euro banknotes”.37 In 
practice, the issue may present little cause for concern since the volume of 
coin issuance by Member States is subject to ECB authorization. The ECB 
could therefore control the volume of digital euros authorized for issuance 
under Article 128(2) TFEU. However, there are more fundamental reasons to 
assume that the European competence to issue a digital euro must prevail. 
The delineation of competences assigned to the European level for 
(tangible) banknotes on the one hand and to the national level for (tangible) 
coins on the other is based on the distinction between major cash in the form 
of banknotes38 and minor cash in the form of small-denomination coins.39 
Only the issuance of minor cash has remained a national competence, subject 
(“[Article 128(1) TFEU] guarantees the very existence of euro banknotes at a constitutional 
level, which suggests that their complete abolition would be contrary to EU law.”) and para 127. 
36. See also Siekmann, “Monetary aspects of the Euro as single European currency – A 
German perspective” in Freitag and Omlor (Eds.), The Euro as Legal Tender: A Comparative 
Approach to a Uniform Concept (De Gruyter, 2020), pp. 1–49, at p. 41 (lex specialis). 
37. This scenario appears at least not to be excluded in the Banque de France Report cited 
supra note 4, at p. 31. 
38. Euro banknotes are issued in six denominations ranging from 5 euros to 200 euros. The 
issuance of EUR 500 banknotes ceased in 2019. 
39. Euro coins are issued in eight denominations ranging from 1 cent to 2 euros. 
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to the ECB’s authorization of the coin issuance volume. However, the splitting 
of jurisdiction between banknotes and coins is rooted in historical 
circumstances that do not manifest themselves in the digital space. Under 
some technological designs, the digital euro will be stored, transferred, and 
accounted for in lump sums, just like book money. Similar to a bank account, 
users will simply control the amount and the digital wallet will show no 
separable “20 cent” or “five euro piece” of the digital euro. Hence, there can 
be no distinction based on smaller or larger denominations with respect to the 
digital euro. Other technological designs allow for users to split tokens in 
coins of different denominations. However, even under such designs, it is 
unnecessary, and indeed complex, to segregate the powers of the Eurosystem 
and those of the Member States’ governments. 
In light of the need to preserve the singleness of the euro, the Eurosystem’s 
competence to issue a digital euro is necessarily exclusive. It must prevail over 
the residual competence of Member States to issue coins, barring the latter 
from issuing a “parallel digital euro” on the basis of Article 128(2) TFEU. The 
reasons are at least threefold. First, on a fundamental level, national 
competence cannot provide for a single digital euro. For this very reason, 
Member States effectively transferred monetary sovereignty to the EU level 
and put the independent ECB/Eurosystem in charge of the issuance of the 
single currency, with the limited exception of (tangible) coins, and of 
implementing a single monetary policy in the euro area.40 Second, allowing 
Member States to issue a limited volume of “their own digital euro” would 
imply a parallel competence41 at the European and national levels to issue 
essentially the same thing. How might the digital euro issued by Member State 
X be distinguished from the digital euro issued by Member State Y and the 
digital euro issued by the Eurosystem? Not only would it make little sense and 
be considerably costly to divide the digitalization of payments between the 
Eurosystem and the Member States, but it may also create confusion among 
users and threaten the singleness of the euro. Third, while the function of 
banknotes is to provide a credit risk-free and trusted means of payment and 
store of value accessible to the general public, coins are limited to 
complementing this function in the form of minor cash in small 
denominations. The digital euro is thus much closer to the concept of 
40. On monetary sovereignty and the euro, see Proctor, Mann on the Legal Aspects of 
Money, 7th ed. (OUP, 2012), Ch. 31; for a conceptualization of monetary sovereignty, see 
Zimmermann, “The concept of monetary sovereignty revisited”, 24 EJIL (2013), 797–818, and 
Zimmermann, A Contemporary Concept of Monetary Sovereignty (OUP, 2013). 
41. Parallel competences cannot exist in the logic of the EU’s legal order. Specifically, they 
differ from shared competences according to Art. 4 TFEU, whereby Member States exercise 
their own competence only where the EU does not exercise or has decided not to exercise its 
own competence. 
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“banknote” as set out in Article 128(1) TFEU than to the concept of “coin” 
according to Article 128(2) TFEU. 
The drafting history of the Maastricht Treaty indicates that Article 128(2) 
TFEU was never intended to control Article 128(1) TFEU. On the contrary, it 
was intended to leave in the hands of the Member States only powers over 
subsidiary objects of payment,42 which are not needed in the case of the digital 
euro. Originally set to also become a supranational competence, the 
competence to issue coins was “returned” to Member States in the course of 
the Maastricht negotiations. Coin issuance had not typically been in the hands 
of the NCBs at the time of the euro’s adoption, but had rather been a power of 
governments or bodies close to them (e.g. a mint). The governors saw no 
cogent reason to break with this tradition. A majority in the Intergovernmental 
Conference (IGC) agreed that coins were “of minor monetary importance” 
and that it would suffice for the ECB to control the volume of coin issuance to 
ensure conformity with its primary objective of price stability.43 
Member States’ interests in maintaining coin issuance as a national 
competence were primarily sentimental and fiscal in nature. Since a digital 
euro would by definition lack a “national side” – like tangible coins’display of 
royalty, national heroes, and historical monuments – the sentimental interests 
would be largely neglected. Member States’ fiscal interests, by contrast, 
would be affected by a loss of seigniorage, achieved today by the net emission 
of EUR 900 million p.a. less costs,44 to the extent that a digital euro would 
substitute tangible coins. To mitigate the fiscal impact, the ECB/NCBs could 
compensate Member States for their lost seigniorage.45 
4. Scope of the Eurosystem’s issuance powers 
The competence to issue banknotes – whether tangible or digital – is a power 
in its own right. In particular, the issuance of digital banknotes by the 
Eurosystem would not require any prior legislative act authorizing the 
Eurosystem to utilize its powers. Article 133 TFEU states the following: 
42. The fact that a limit of acceptance (50 pieces) exists only for coins attests to their 
subsidiary nature. See Art. 11, third sentence, Council Regulation (EC) 974/98 on the 
introduction of the euro, O.J. 1998, L 139/1 (“2nd Euro-Regulation”). 
43. Van den Berg, op. cit. supra note 29, at p. 338. 
44. ECB Statistical Data Warehouse, available at <sdw.ecb.europa.eu/reports.do?node= 
1000004114>. 
45. Each NCB could credit the relevant Member State’s account with digital euros up to the 
value of coins no longer authorized for issuance by the ECB every year.The amount would have 
to be set for the future based on the (overall quite linear) development to date. 
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“Without prejudice to the powers of the European Central Bank, the 
European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the 
ordinary legislative procedure, shall lay down the measures necessary for 
the use of the euro as the single currency. Such measures shall be adopted 
after consultation of the European Central Bank.” (emphasis added). 
Article 133 TFEU provides for the legislative competence at EU level to issue 
secondary law acts to address certain issues pertaining to the use of the euro. 
These are ancillary acts of legislation that cannot and must not interfere with 
the Treaty powers and independence46 granted to the ECB/Eurosystem. The 
adoption of the euro necessitated the establishment of a detailed legal 
framework to facilitate the substitution of national currencies and to address 
practical matters arising from the introduction of a single currency.47 
Moreover, as Member States retained the competence to issue euro coins and 
only the power over the volume of coin issuance was transferred to the ECB, 
it fell to the EU legislature to regulate the denominations and technical 
specifications of euro coins and ensure uniformity for the euro area.48 
4.1. Direct and incidental powers and their delegability 
By contrast, all matters regarding the design of euro banknotes, including 
denominations, specifications, and security, relate to powers incidental to the 
issuance function and power according to Article 128(1) TFEU and Article 16 
ESCB Statute, and are therefore laid down in ECB decisions.49 The 
46. Arts. 130 and 282(3) TFEU; Art. 7 ESCB Statute. 
47. See Council Regulation (EC) 1103/97 on certain provisions relating to the introduction 
of the euro, O.J. 1997, L 300/1 (“1st Euro-Regulation”), pertaining to the continuity of contracts 
and ECU-denominated obligations as well as conversion and rounding; 2nd Euro-Regulation 
(974/98), introducing euro banknotes and coins over a transitional period and regulating the 
substitution of national currencies; Council Regulation (EC) 2866/98 on the conversion rates 
between the euro and the currencies of the Member States adopting the euro, O.J. 1998, L 359/1, 
determining the conversion rates at which, up to today, banknotes and coins denominated in 
national currencies can be converted into euro; Council Regulation (EC) 1338/2001 laying 
down measures necessary for the protection of the euro against counterfeiting, O.J. 2001, L 
181/6, which applies to both banknotes and coins. 
48. See Council Regulation (EU) 729/2014 on denominations and technical specifications 
of euro coins intended for circulation (Recast), O.J. 2014, L 194/1. This legislative competence 
derives from Art. 128(2) TFEU. 
49. Decisions ECB/2013/10 and ECB/2019/9 regarding denominations, specifications, 
reproduction, exchange and withdrawal; Decisions ECB/2008/3, ECB/2010/14 and 
ECB/2012/19 regarding security. Art. 10 2nd Euro-Regulation (974/98) is purely declaratory in 
nature, merely repeating the legal tender status assigned to euro banknotes by primary law (Art. 
128(1) TFEU and Art. 16 ESCB Statute). 
1042 Grünewald, Zellweger-Gutknecht, Geva CML Rev. 2021 
production and distribution of euro banknotes also pertain to incidental 
powers. Both are undertaken by the euro area NCBs, while the ECB oversees 
the NCBs’ activities and fosters harmonization of cash services within the 
euro area. 
The direct and incidental powers of the ECB/Eurosystem derived from 
Article 128(1) TFEU and Article 16 ESCB Statute with a view to the digital 
euro mirror those applicable for tangible euro banknotes. They include the 
decision on the digital euro’s technological design and the modalities of its 
issuance, distribution, and transfer.50 While the former concerns questions 
such as whether or not distributed-ledger technology51 should be used, as well 
as the digital euro’s privacy and safety features, the latter determines the way 
in which the digital euro is made available to the public for its further use as a 
means of payment and store of value. 
The existence of these direct and incidental powers does not necessarily 
imply that all related tasks must and will be fully conducted by the 
ECB/Eurosystem itself. In many instances, the involvement of private market 
participants in implementing these tasks on a competitive basis will ensure 
innovative and efficient solutions, thereby enhancing the attractiveness of the 
digital euro. This raises the question as to which of the ECB’s/Eurosystem’s 
direct and incidental powers in relation to the digital euro are delegable and 
which are not.52 
In line with the established ECJ case law on Treaty-imposed restrictions 
regarding the delegability of powers by EU institutions to agencies or private 
legal persons,53 the distinction between decision-making and implementation 
50. For more details on both aspects, see Geva, Grünewald and Zellweger-Gutknecht, op. 
cit. supra note 15. 
51. Distributed-ledger technology (DLT) refers to a protocol that allows for the secure 
functioning of a digital database using cryptography and is shared by multiple participants 
(nodes). Its main novelty is that it eliminates the need for a central authority to guard against 
manipulations. 
52. The following assumes that the digital euro would have legal tender status. See infra 
section 5 on legal tender. 
53. In Meroni, the ECJ ruled, in particular, that delegations of power were only legitimate if 
they were necessary for the performance of the task at hand and that any delegation of power 
could only relate to clearly defined executive powers, the use of which must be subject to the 
supervision of the delegating institution (in that case, the Commission). However, delegated 
powers giving agencies or private legal persons “a degree of latitude which implies a wide 
margin of discretion . . .  cannot be considered as compatible with the requirements of the 
Treaty”. Case 9/56, Meroni & Co. v. High Authority, EU:C:1958:7, p. 154. According to 
Romano, agencies must not be empowered to adopt normative measures, i.e. “acts having the 
force of law”. Case 98/80, Giuseppe Romano v. Institut national d’assurance 
maladie-invalidité, EU:C:1981:104, para 20. In ESMA-short selling, the ECJ clarified that EU 
administrative agencies can be the recipients of limited executive discretionary powers under 
the current Treaties. Case C-270/12, United Kingdom v. Parliament and Council, EU:C: 
2014:18. 
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may serve as a key point of reference in this regard. This implies that strategy 
and the definition of all essential features of the core digital euro infrastructure 
cannot be delegated. Clearly defined tasks that merely execute the decisions 
taken or utilize the core infrastructure to facilitate the use of the digital euro, 
by contrast, may be left to the market.54 This division of labour takes into 
account that market participants have always supported the Eurosystem in 
executing its tasks related to tangible banknotes. While authorization, 
issuance, and design of tangible banknotes remain within the remit of the 
Eurosystem, production and distribution are to some extent outsourced to 
external manufacturers and financial intermediaries. Euro banknotes are 
printed by eleven high-security printing works in Europe and then distributed 
among the various NCBs. A pooling arrangement and common quality 
management system ensure a uniform production standard for all euro 
banknotes regardless of where they are printed.55 Distribution is realized 
through the cash distribution systems (encompassing distribution units, vaults 
etc.) of the NCBs under the surveillance of the ECB. The NCBs distribute 
banknotes mainly via the banking system and partly via retail trade.56 
As for the digital euro, its design would include the definition of the core 
infrastructure’s features and would thus remain non-delegable as a task of 
public authority. Its production, on the other hand, would concern the 
operation of this infrastructure and could, as an implementing task, be 
delegated to private market participants. Similarly, market participants could 
be key in designing applications for the distribution and storage/transfer of the 
digital euro – a task that clearly concerns implementation. Even in these cases, 
however, delegability will hinge on the Eurosystem’s definition of standards 
for and supervision of the execution of clearly defined tasks by market 
participants. 
54. This argument is similar to the ECB’s approach, according to which the “back-end 
infrastructure” should ultimately be controlled by the Eurosystem, whereas “end-user access 
solutions” could be left to the market. See ECB Report cited supra note 5, at pp. 36–44. 
55. See <www.ecb.europa.eu/euro/intro/production/html/index.en.html>. 
56. See <www.ecb.europa.eu/euro/intro/issuance/html/index.en.html>. 
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NCBs → Market 
(92%)57,58 
Coins ECB Member EU Member Member None (users 
States legisla- States States only) 
ture (mint) → NCBs 
(Member (→ Market) 
States) 
Digital ECB ECB/ ECB delegation delegation delegation 
euro NCBs possible possible possible 
(running (applications (applications 
the infra- designed by designed by 
structure) the market) the market) 
Table 1: Overview competences and delegability (assuming legal tender 
status) 
While NCBs utilize supervised intermediaries, in particular for the 
distribution of tangible banknotes, delegation is expected to play a 
significantly greater role with respect to the digital euro. Indeed, from an 
operational point of view, preference should be given to models in which the 
Eurosystem merely provides the core infrastructure and a minimum necessary 
functionality for payments. On the basis of this core infrastructure, private 
sector firms – among them necessarily banks – could connect and offer 
customer-facing services and build additional functionality.60 While the 
Eurosystem would ensure security, resilience, and interoperability, the private 
sector could inject further innovation into its services within a competitive 
57. Decisions ECB/2010/29 and ECB/2014/49: The issuance quota – i.e. the percentage 
share of euro banknotes to be issued by the ECB – is determined by the Governing Council. The 
liabilities in respect of the issue of the remaining value of euro banknotes in circulation are 
allocated in accordance with the share of each NCB in the paid-up capital of the ECB. The 8% 
was introduced by Decision ECB/2001/15. Previously, only the NCBs were issuers. 
58. Euro banknotes are circulated to meet a demand, while the issuance quota regulates the 
distribution of the related issuance by creating intra-Eurosystem claims. The actual circulation 
of euro banknotes in a given Member State may thus be higher or lower than the issuance quota 
allocated to that Member State’s NCB. 
59. See e.g. Decision ECB/2020/24 regarding accreditation for manufacturers of 
euro-secure items and euro items. 
60. See ECB Report cited supra note 5, at p. 20 (“cooperation with market participants”). 
See also the model proposed in Bank of England Discussion Paper cited supra note 4, at 25–26. 
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environment. Moreover, compliance with anti-money laundering and related 
regulatory restrictions could rely on existing systems and processes in place at 
commercial banks and other intermediaries. 
A further novelty implied by the digital euro is that delegation may concern 
firms that are outside the Eurosystem’s direct or indirect supervisory remit, 
such as telecommunication firms that design and provide cell phone 
applications for the distribution, transfer, and storage of the digital euro. To 
ensure that the Eurosystem retains its responsibility for, and control over, the 
execution of tasks incidental to the issuance of a digital euro, the ECB would 
be obliged to lay out general requirements for delegees and to approve the use 
of delegees in individual cases.61 
4.2. Boundaries to the Eurosystem’s powers: Fundamental rights and the 
principle of an open market economy 
Boundaries to the Eurosystem’s powers to issue a digital euro could potentially 
emerge from the fundamental right to conduct a business as enshrined in 
Article 16 of the Charter62 and the principle of an open market economy with 
free competition.63 Depending on its technical design and the financial 
conditions attached to it, the digital euro has the potential to change – possibly 
dramatically – the conditions under which commercial banks traditionally 
conduct their business. This raises questions as to what the legitimate 
expectations of banks are and, more generally, how large the central bank’s 
footprint in financial intermediation should be. 
The economics literature offers several insights into the potential 
consequences that the issuance of a digital euro might have for commercial 
banks (and other financial entities64).65 One major fear relates to the risk of 
disintermediation. The issuance of a digital euro could have the (unintended) 
side effect of creating competition with commercial bank deposits,66 as 
households and companies may consider the digital euro an alternative to 
61. Alternatively, the Eurosystem could insist on maintaining a supervised financial 
intermediary as primary contact. 
62. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, O.J. 2012, C 326/391. 
63. See Arts. 119(2) and 127(1) TFEU; Art. 2 ESCB Statute. 
64. E.g. payment services providers, money-transmission businesses, and other entities 
operating in the markets for stored-value products. 
65. For an instructive analysis, see Juks, “When a central bank digital currency meets 
private money: Effects of an e-krona on banks” in Special issue on the e-krona, op. cit. supra 
note 26, 79–99. 
66. This effect is less likely/pronounced for a token-based digital euro than for an 
account-based digital euro, but nevertheless warrants some attention. 
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deposits rather than to cash.67 Faced with the risk of outflowing retail deposits, 
commercial banks would encounter higher funding costs – either by offering 
a better value proposition to their depositors68 or by turning to more expensive 
(and potentially less stable) wholesale funding markets.69 Moreover, they 
would be forced to adapt their business models to the “new reality” of a 
diminished deposit base, with still uncertain effects on the economy at large.70 
Arguably, however, the greatest risk to financial stability stems from the fact 
that a digital euro would facilitate a flight from commercial bank deposits to 
the safety of central bank money in a distressed market environment (“digital 
runs”).71 
While digital runs pose a real risk that must be appropriately managed, 
disintermediation under normal market conditions may primarily result from 
the removal of overly favourable refinancing conditions for banks to date. In 
fact, the availability of a digital credit risk-free and trusted money may enable 
rather than interfere with a competitive level playing field, benefitting 
depositors in jurisdictions where banks use their market power to keep interest 
rates paid on deposits depressed and removing (more or less hidden) subsidies 
in their funding.72 Moreover, the introduction of a digital euro may open up 
new business avenues for commercial banks in the development and offering 
of customer-facing services and additional functionality for payments in 
digital euros.73 
67. See e.g. Bindseil, “Tiered CBDC and the financial system”, ECB Working Paper Series 
No. 2351 (Jan. 2020), at 9–14; BIS CPMI/MC Report cited supra note 4, at pp. 14–16; Wierts 
and Boven, op. cit. supra note 29, at 19. 
68. That is, improving services or paying higher interest rates or both. See e.g. Adrian and 
Mancini-Griffoli, “The rise of digital money”, IMF Fintech Note/19/01 (July 2019), at 10; 
Hofmann, op. cit. supra note 33, at 61; Berentsen and Schär, “The case for central bank 
electronic money and the non-case for central bank cryptocurrencies”, (2018) Fed Reserve 
Bank St. Louis Review, 97–106, at 101–102; Juks, op. cit. supra note 65, at 90–91 (under the 
assumption of an interest-bearing e-krona, however). 
69. Nabilou, op. cit. supra note 28, at 309 (with further references). 
70. BIS CPMI/MC Report cited supra note 4, at pp. 15–16. For example, banks’ ability to 
extend loans to the real economy may be compromised; see Nabilou, op. cit. supra note 28, at 
309. Juks, op. cit. supra note 65, at 68, does not anticipate a major risk of this happening in 
normal market conditions. 
71. Even in the presence of deposit insurance, a digital euro may lead to bank runs at 
“unprecedented speed and scale”; BIS CPMI/MC Report cited supra note 4, at p. 16. See also 
Nabilou, op. cit. supra note 28, at 309 (with further references). 
72. Similarly, Andolfatto, “Assessing the impact of central bank digital currency on private 
banks”, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Paper No. 2018-026D (Oct. 2018). A 
fundamental analysis of banks’ market power vis-à-vis retail depositors is given in Drechsler, 
Savov and Schnabl, “Banking on deposits: Maturity transformation without interest rate risk”, 
NBER Working Papers 24582 (May 2018), at 34–38. 
73. Bank of Canada Report cited supra note 4, section 4, highlights the need for commercial 
banks to adapt to a more competitive environment owing to payment system modernization, 
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Nevertheless, the introduction of a digital euro could force commercial 
banks (at least de facto) to accept a decrease in market power or to implement 
measures that may entail costs and loss of income for them. This may impair 
the freedom to conduct business that commercial banks enjoy under Article 
16 of the Charter. The ECB, like any other institution of the EU, is bound to 
observe fundamental rights when applying the Treaties and executing its 
tasks. In particular, it must ensure that any measure that it implements is 
justified in light of the legitimate goals that it pursues and proportionate to the 
potentially affected rights of third parties. 
In many ways, the cash-like design of a digital euro already implies the 
mildest means by which the dwindling of cash and its negative effects on 
monetary stability may be counteracted. Such a digital euro may create 
competition for payment accounts held by the public at commercial banks but 
is unlikely to substitute (interest-bearing) savings accounts under normal 
market conditions. The need for specific (economic) design features of 
the digital euro to help ensure that the impact on commercial banks and the 
stability of the banking system is proportional is therefore limited. 
Such design features, as proposed in the literature, would allow the 
Eurosystem to regulate demand for the digital euro: (1) by charging or paying 
interest on the digital euros issued;74 (2) by imposing access limits;75 or (3) by 
limiting convertibility to selected non-bank assets, such as government 
bonds or cash.76 While an interest-bearing euro would violate Article 128(1) 
TFEU,77 the limitation of convertibility would imply an unacceptable 
loss of fungibility between the euro’s different manifestations, would be 
complex, and would run counter to the notion of the digital euro as a 
public retail money. The present paper finds a more acceptable solution to be 
limits on the amount of digital euros that each person and entity78 could 
new policies on access to consumer data, and new competition from technology-focused 
financial companies – whether or not the central bank issues a digital currency. 
74. See e.g. Kiff, Alwazir, Davidovic, Farias, Khan, Khiaonarong, Malaika, Monroe, 
Sugimoto,Tourpe and Zhou, “A survey of research on retail central bank digital currency”, IMF 
Working Papers WP/20/104 (26 June 2020), at 33–34; Bank of England Discussion Paper cited 
supra note 4, at 38–39. Bindseil, op. cit. supra note 67, proposes a tiered remuneration system. 
75. For example, to residents and non-residents with nationalities from within the euro area 
(Wierts and Boven, op. cit. supra note 29, at 34) or via absolute ceilings, e.g. Gürtler, Nielsen, 
Rasmussen and Spange, “Central bank digital currency in Denmark?”, Danmarks Nationalbank 
Analysis No. 28 (Dec. 2017), at 16–17; Kiff et al., op. cit. supra note 74, at 31–33. 
76. See e.g. Wierts and Boven, op. cit. supra note 29, at 21; Juks, op. cit. supra note 65, at 
96; Kiff et al., op. cit. supra note 74, at 16. 
77. See supra section 2.2. 
78. While access to the digital euro could theoretically be limited to households (i.e. private 
persons), the present authors favour a design of widespread access (i.e. including businesses, 
financial institutions as well as public authorities) that falls squarely within the design of 
tangible cash. 
1048 Grünewald, Zellweger-Gutknecht, Geva CML Rev. 2021 
hold.79 However, limits on the holdings of digital euros conflict with a legal 
tender concept that encompasses limitless use of cash as a store of value. It can 
therefore only serve as a safeguard during an adjustment period for the 
banking sector while tangible cash is still in use. 
5. Legal tender status of a digital euro 
The issuance of a digital euro on the basis of Article 128(1) TFEU involves a 
binary choice when it comes to the digital euro’s legal tender status. The third 
sentence of Article 128(1) TFEU80 states the following: 
“The banknotes issued by the European Central Bank and the national 
central banks shall be the only such notes to have the status of legal tender 
within the Union.” 
Accordingly, a digital euro issued by the Eurosystem by definition has legal 
tender status based on primary law – that is, without the need for secondary 
law to that end. An issuance model according to which issuance powers are 
delegated to non-Eurosystem entities, such as commercial banks, in contrast, 
would imply that the digital euro lacks legal tender status based on primary 
law. While the wording of Article 128(1) TFEU permits the ECB to authorize 
the issuance of a digital euro by commercial banks, it explicitly precludes the 
bestowal of legal tender status on such a digital euro.81 Secondary law 
assigning legal tender status to a digital euro issued by entities outside the 
Eurosystem would thus be in violation of primary law.82 In short, whether or 
not a digital euro possesses legal tender status depends on who its legal issuer 
79. See also Wierts and Boven, op. cit. supra note 29, at 21 and 34. They speak of a ceiling 
at (or base part up to) between EUR 3,000 and 4,000 per natural person (leaving open the 
question of the amount that could be retained by legal entities and public authorities). This 
amount per capita would result in a total amount of retained digital euros comparable to that of 
cash in 2019 in the Netherlands (pp. 36–37). 
80. Identical in its wording is also Art. 16, third sentence, ESCB Statue. See also Art. 10, 
second sentence, 2nd Euro-Regulation (974/98) (which is purely declaratory in character). 
81. Art. 128(1) TFEU was phrased to accommodate the British practice, according to 
which some commercial banks in Scotland and Northern Ireland issue their own (tangible) 
banknotes fully backed by the pound sterling. These banknotes are not legal tender even in 
Scotland or Northern Ireland, but they are widely used throughout each respective territory and 
accepted as if they were banknotes issued by the Bank of England, which are legal tender in each 
territory. Van den Berg, op. cit. supra note 29, at p. 326. 
82. See also Opinion in Joined Cases C-422 & 423/19, Hessischer Rundfunk, para 94. 
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is,83 and is therefore a consequence of the digital euro’s architecture and the 
issuance model chosen.84 
Monetary object Issuer Legal tender status 
Banknote (tangible ECB/NCBs By definition (based on 
and digital) (Art. Art. 128(1) TFEU) 
1281(1) TFEU) Commercial banks Excluded (based on 
(subject to ECB Art. 128(1) TFEU) 
authorization) 
Coin (tangible) (Art. Member States Yes (based on Art. 11 
128(2) TFEU) Regulation 974/98) 
Table 2: Overview legal tender status of monetary objects denominated in 
euro 
5.1. Meaning of legal tender in the EU 
The precise meaning of legal tender and its implications for EU and national 
private and public law are somewhat uncertain. Prior to the adoption of the 
euro, each euro area Member State had its own distinct understanding of the 
meaning of legal tender with a view to its national currency.85 These 
understandings were often based on historical tradition, doctrine, and/or case 
law rather than statutory provisions. Article 128(1) TFEU refers to the term 
“legal tender” without defining it. 
The EU has not (yet) utilized its exclusive competence in matters of 
monetary policy to clarify the issue.86 Hence, the prevalent understanding of 
legal tender remains a largely “open concept”.87 Secondary law referring to 
the status of the euro as legal tender is scarce and generally limited to 
assigning legal tender status to certain (tangible) manifestations of the euro, 
83. “Issuance” essentially refers to the appearance on the liability side of the central or 
commercial bank’s balance sheet. 
84. For an overview of possible alternative architectures and issuance models see Geva, 
Grünewald and Zellweger-Gutknecht, op. cit. supra note 15. 
85. See European Legal Tender Expert Group (ELTEG), “Report on the definition, scope 
and effects of legal tender of euro banknotes and coins” (Brussels, 21 Jan. 2009), at p. 5 and 
Annex (pp. 23–73). 
86. See Art. 3(1)(c) TFEU. A minority within the ELTEG, however, was of the opinion that 
the EU had already utilized its (limited) competence to define legal tender and that all further 
implications of the legal tender status were governed by national law. See ELTEG Report cited 
supra note 85, at p. 2. 
87. See e.g. Mersch, “The role of euro banknotes as legal tender”, speech at the 4th 
Bargeldsymposium of the Deutsche Bundesbank (Frankfurt, 14 Feb. 2018). 
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without further clarifying the fundamental consequences of that status.88 
Instead, in 2010, the Commission adopted a non-binding Recommendation89 
on the scope and effects of legal tender of euro banknotes and coins, addressed 
to euro area Member States and the ECB, amongst others.90 This 
Recommendation was informed by the findings of the European Legal Tender 
Expert Group (ELTEG), an inter-institutional working group composed of 
national and EU experts.91 
The ELTEG had reached a consensus on three core implications of the 
concept of legal tender, later adopted in Article 1 of the Commission 
Recommendation: (1) duty to accept (unless explicitly agreed otherwise); (2) 
acceptance at full face value; and (3) legal recognition as a means of discharge 
from payment obligations. These three core features may be regarded as a 
common denominator between the different national understandings of the 
legal tender concept within the euro area. 
As a concept of EU law, legal tender as referred to in Article 128(1) TFEU 
must be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the EU. 
In a recent request for a preliminary ruling, the ECJ used the Commission 
Recommendation as guidance for further clarifying the meaning and scope of 
legal tender under EU law. The Court was asked to rule on the question 
whether Member States whose currency is the euro may adopt measures 
restricting the use of cash and hence on the effects of the legal tender status of 
euro banknotes provided for in EU law.92 The case concerned two German 
citizens, whose attempt to pay a radio and television licence fee to Hessischer 
Rundfunk – the public broadcaster for the state of Hesse – in cash was rejected 
on the basis of the broadcaster’s payment procedure rules. 
The ECJ asserted that the concept of legal tender entails, in principle, the 
mandatory acceptance of euro banknotes by the creditor of a payment 
obligation. However, Member States may adopt national rules, which do not 
“abolish, in law or in fact, cash in euro, in particular by calling into question 
the possibility, as a general rule, of discharging a payment obligation in 
cash”,93 but impose “for reasons of public interest” restrictions on the 
88. An exception is Art. 11 2nd Euro-Regulation (974/98), giving creditors the right to 
refuse acceptance of more than 50 euro-denominated coins, although the implications of that 
provision remain opaque. See Freitag, “Euro as legal tender (and banknotes)” in Hermann and 
Amtenbrink (Eds.), EU Law of Economic and Monetary Union (OUP, 2020), pp. 595–614, at 
para 21.26. 
89. Art. 288(5) TFEU. 
90. Commission Recommendation 2010/191/EU on the scope and effects of legal tender of 
euro banknotes and coins, O.J. 2010, L 83/70. 
91. ELTEG Report cited supra note 85. 
92. Joined Cases C-422 & 423/19, Johannes Dietrich and Norbert Häring v. Hessischer 
Rundfunk, EU:C:2021:63. 
93. Ibid., para 62. 
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acceptance of euro banknotes as a means of payment.94 Such restrictions are 
compatible with the concept of legal tender as enshrined in EU law insofar as 
they do not have “the object or effect of establishing legal rules governing the 
status of legal tender of [euro] banknotes” and are proportionate to the public 
interest objective pursued.95 The ECJ clarified that considerations of cost 
efficiency may provide a public interest “capable of justifying a limitation on 
cash payments, in particular where the number of licence fee payers from 
whom the debt has to be recovered is very high”.96 Moreover, restrictions on 
payments in cash will not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the public 
interest objective pursued if other lawful means of payment for the settlement 
of debts are available.97 
With a view to the proportionality of national restrictions on the use of euro 
banknotes to make payments, the Advocate General had emphasized the 
inclusion element of cash. For many (unbanked) people, “cash is the only form 
of accessible money and therefore the only means to exercise their 
fundamental rights linked to the use of money”.98 According to the Advocate 
General, these “vulnerable people” should be allowed to discharge their 
monetary obligations without additional costs.99 This would appear to pertain 
in particular to monetary obligations that are public in nature, such as radio 
and television licence fees. The ECJ agreed with this stance, stating that there 
might be a need to provide for those without access to alternative means of 
payment of the radio and television licence fee to be able to pay in cash.100 
5.2. Reasons for a digital euro to have legal tender status 
The existence of legal tender is often explained by its stability and 
trust-building effects and the fact that it facilitates the exercise of fundamental 
94. Ibid., paras. 66 and 67. 
95. Ibid., para 78. 
96. Ibid., para 74. According to the written observations of Hessischer Rundfunk, there are 
approximately 46 million licence fee payers in Germany (para 72). 
97. Ibid., paras. 75 and 78. See already Opinion in Joined Cases C-422 & 423/19, 
Hessischer Rundfunk, para 167. The “lawful means of payment” (paras. 110–111) refers to 
Recital 19, 2nd Euro-Regulation (974/98). Siekmann, op. cit. supra note 36, at p. 44, disagrees, 
since a recital is not part of the provision, and the content of the Recital would negate an 
essential trait of legal tender. For a historical interpretation of Recital 19, 2nd Euro-Regulation, 
based on recently emerged materials, see Häring, “Hier erstmals veröffentlichte 
Archivdokumente zeigen: Die Rechtfertigung von Bargeldobergrenzen ist falsch”, Blog post (6 
June 2020), available at <norberthaering.de/bargeld-widerstand/bargeldobergrenzen-archi 
vdokumente/>. 
98. Opinion in Joined Cases C-422 & 423/19, Hessischer Rundfunk, para 137. 
99. Ibid., para 138. 
100. Joined Cases C-422/19 & 423/19, Hessischer Rundfunk, para 77. 
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freedoms.101 Cash as legal tender serves several public interests. The ECB, in 
charge of authorizing the issuance of euro banknotes, therefore, considers 
itself to be “responsible for protecting the status of euro cash as the sole legal 
tender”, including by “guaranteeing the existence of euro cash and its usability 
as legal tender”.102 
Is it really mandatory for a means of payment and store of value to have 
legal tender status to serve its key functions in the public interest? In other 
words, would any major drawbacks ensue if no legal tender in a strict sense 
were available to the general public – for example, if physical cash were 
naturally replaced at some point in time by a digital euro that lacked formal 
legal tender status?103 This question has both a policy and a legal aspect.As far 
as policy is concerned, history reveals a remarkable desire on the part of 
policy-makers to maintain a formal legal tender at all times. In the transitional 
period lasting from 1 January 1999 to 31 December 2001, when no 
euro-denominated legal tender yet existed, pre-existing national currencies 
were declared to be sub-divisions of the euro to avoid a period without legal 
tender.104 The banknotes and coins denominated in a national currency kept 
their status as legal tender within their territorial limits until 31 December 
2001105 and even beyond.106 
The concept of legal tender originated with the mint lords who forced their 
people to accept the money they issued so that they could earn seigniorage.107 
While the fiscal interest in maintaining the legal tender concept may now be 
outdated, legal tender remains important as a means of spurring demand for a 
currency. Legal tender regularly implies that: (1) the government must accept 
101. See Mersch, op. cit. supra note 87; Opinion in Joined Cases C-422 & 423/19, 
Hessischer Rundfunk, paras. 134–138. 
102. Mersch, op. cit. supra note 87. 
103. History shows that the need for a legal tender in the strict sense may be bypassed. 
Kosovo’s currency regulation under the UN Administration, for example, established the 
following: (1) freedom to choose currency; (2) presumption of use of currency widely used; and 
(3) power of the government to designate such a currency for specific uses. See Regulation 
1999/4 on the currency permitted for use in Kosovo, issued by the UN Administration in 
Kosovo (UNMIK), 2 Sept. 1999, available at <www.bqk-kos.org/repository/docs/2010/ 
UNMIK_REG_1999_4.pdf>. Although the Regulation avoided the use of the term “legal ten-
der”, the media took it to mean that the Deutschmark effectively replaced theYugoslav dinar as 
official legal tender in Kosovo. See e.g. “Kosovo adopts Deutschmark”, BBC News, 3 Sept. 
1999. 
104. Art. 6 2nd Euro-Regulation (974/98). More specifically, “money of payment” was 
distinct from “money of account”. 
105. Art. 9 2nd Euro-Regulation (974/98). 
106. According to Art. 15 2nd Euro-Regulation (974/98), banknotes and coins 
denominated in national currency kept their former status as legal tender for a maximum of 6 
months after the end of the transition period. 
107. See e.g. Mundell, “Monetary unions and the problem of sovereignty”, 579 The Annals 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (2002), 123–152, at 130, 134. 
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its own currency;108 and (2) private parties will accept it if nothing else has 
been agreed upon. For these reasons, it is recommended that a digital euro 
possesses formal legal tender status (i.e. is issued by the Eurosystem).109 
From a strictly legal perspective, however, formal legal tender status is not 
mandatory. This article argues that some form of public money must be 
available to serve as a credit risk-free and trusted means of payment and store 
of value for the general public and that the Eurosystem must guarantee a form 
of such public money. However, even if the digital euro were to become the 
only form of public money at some point in the future, it would not be legally 
necessary for it to possess formal legal tender status. The legal position of a 
non-legal tender digital euro could (and would have to) be clarified in 
alternative ways. For example, to ensure that payment in digital euro 
discharges a citizen of public debts (such as taxes or television fees), the ECB 
could allow direct payment in digital euro by adopting a legal act to that end. 
In the unlikely event that a government might refuse to be paid in digital euro, 
the respective NCB could serve as a (tax) debt-collecting agent, crediting the 
government’s reserve account when it receives payment from a taxpayer. As 
long as tangible cash continues to exist, a non-legal tender digital euro could 
be “attached” to the legal tender status of tangible banknotes and coins 
through the ECB’s guaranteeing the conversion of digital euros to tangible 
cash promptly and in all instances.110 
6. Conclusion 
In light of the ever-growing digitalization of society and the prospect of the 
declining use of cash, the ECB is exploring various options with the aim of 
introducing a digital euro. This article tackled the core question of whether 
and to what extent the Eurosystem is indeed competent de lege lata to issue 
such a digital currency. On the basis of a textual, historical, teleological, and 
systematic interpretation of Article 128(1) TFEU and Article 16 ESCB 
Statute, it answered the question in the affirmative, but also highlighted that 
the Eurosystem’s competence is limited in one crucial aspect: Article 128(1) 
and Article 16 ESCB Statute only allow for the issuance of a digital euro that 
mimics in its design the functions of tangible cash. This precludes a design as 
an instrument of monetary policy – for example, as interest-bearing. In other 
words, like tangible cash, the digital euro would (and should) help safeguard 
108. The judgment in Joined Cases C-422 & 423/19, Hessischer Rundfunk, is instructive. 
109. On the inclusion element of cash see Opinion in Joined Cases C-422 & 423/19, 
Hessischer Rundfunk, paras. 135–138. 
110. Banque de France Report cited supra note 4, at p. 32. 
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the monetary policy transmission mechanisms but must not be used to alter the 
mechanism itself. 
This article’s findings have fundamental implications. The Eurosystem is 
empowered to complement its cash issuance with the issuance of a digital 
equivalent to euro banknotes without the need for a Treaty amendment or any 
authorizing legislative act to that end. The Eurosystem’s powers on the basis of 
Article 128(1) TFEU include incidental powers as to the design of the digital 
euro as well as its production, distribution, and storage/transfer. With the 
exception of design, most of these incidental powers are delegable to private 
market players, such as commercial banks. The Eurosystem’s powers to issue 
a digital euro are necessarily exclusive and prevail over the remaining powers 
of Member States to issue tangible coins. Whether or not the digital euro will 
possess legal tender status is ultimately a policy question to be decided by the 
Eurosystem. It depends on whether the Eurosystem itself will issue the digital 
euro or whether issuance is delegated to commercial banks against a full 
central bank money reserve. 
Conversely, the article’s findings imply that the issuance of a retail digital 
euro to directly serve the ECB’s monetary policy would necessitate a political 
mandate. Banknotes have never served as – and were never intended to serve 
as – a monetary policy instrument. To turn them into such instruments, even if 
they are digital in format, would violate Article 128(1) TFEU both in letter 
and spirit. A secondary legal act on the basis of Article 133 TFEU would not 
suffice to address the issue. Even if “use of the euro” were interpreted broadly 
to include the use of the digital euro as an instrument to transmit monetary 
impulses, secondary law cannot circumvent the limitations imposed by 
Article 128(1) TFEU in terms of the functions to be served by banknotes. An 
amendment of the Treaties would have to establish that the digital euro could 
simultaneously serve as both a store of value and a means of payment to the 
general public and as a monetary policy instrument. In light of the 
far-reaching and fundamental changes that such an amendment would 
instigate, it is doubtful that a simplified revision procedure on the basis of 
Article 48(6) TEU would suffice.111 In particular, the possibility that the 
Eurosystem might introduce negative interest on digital euro holdings would 
arguably amount to a form of tax that is beyond the EU’s current competences, 
111. The simplified revision procedure according to Art. 48(6) TEU was deployed in 2011 
to introduce Art. 136(3) TFEU to legitimize the establishment of the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM). See e.g. De Witte, “The European Treaty amendment for the creation of a 
Financial Stability Mechanism”, Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, European 
Policy Analysis (June 2011). 
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thus requiring that the Treaties be amended in an ordinary revision 
procedure.112 
The Eurogroup has identified the digital euro as a “top priority” while 
conceding the main responsibility to the ECB.113 This article confirmed that 
the ECB is indeed not only empowered but also obligated to issue a digital 
euro on the basis of Article 128(1) TFEU if the decline in the use of cash 
continues (as is to be expected). With the establishment of an internal task 
force and the publication of its digital euro report in October 2020, the ECB 
has taken the first necessary steps to meet its obligations.The numerous policy 
choices involved in the issuance of a digital euro will have to be guided by 
technological expertise and sound legal analysis. The aim of this article was to 
underpin the emerging legal and policy debate with an account of the scope 
and limitations of the ECB’s Treaty powers with respect to the digital euro. 
112. Art. 48(1)–(5) TEU. 
113. Remarks by Paschal Donohoe following the Eurogroup video conference of 3 Nov. 
2020, available at <www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/11/03/remarks-by 
-paschal-donohoe-following-the-eurogroup-video-conference-of-3-november-2020/> (“It is 
absolutely clear that the design of and final decision upon issuing a digital euro is largely the 
responsibility of the ECB.”). 
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